There is a tendency to assume that Iran wants ‘the bomb’. This claim has been repeated – in the press and in some policy circles – with little nuance. However, a more compelling explanation for Iran’s nuclear activities is that it seeks a position of nuclear latency.
Nuclear latency vs nuclear hedging
This refers to a state’s ability to develop the technical capacity for nuclear weapons while choosing not to build them, a stance taken by many countries with advanced nuclear energy programs. Japan and Brazil, for example, are often described as “one screwdriver away” from a nuclear weapon. Yet their programs face far less scrutiny than Iran’s because they are widely viewed as lacking the political intent to weaponize. The blend of technical latency and political intent is sometimes described as a nuclear hedging strategy, a term analysts use to highlight what they see as distinctive about Iran’s case.
Indeed, many analysts argue that Iran already qualifies as a nuclear‑latent state. Its continued enrichment and stockpiling of uranium beyond International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) limits not only strengthens Iran’s technical ability to proliferate but also creates leverage in negotiations over its nuclear program. This dynamic is especially important for actors seeking to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, particularly the United States and its allies.
The limits of coercion
The nuclear issue cannot be addressed through coercion alone. In Iran’s case, this has included “maximum pressure” sanctions and airstrikes on its nuclear facilities. The United States and Israel carried out so called pre-emptive strikes strikes in June 2025 and again beginning in February 2026. Yet even after the 2025 attacks, U.S. officials estimated that the impact on Iran’s ability to produce weapons‑grade uranium was only temporary. Research on earlier cases, most notably Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, has shown that counter‑proliferation attacks are generally unsuccessful and can even push states closer to pursuing nuclear weapons. This leaves diplomacy as the only viable path forward.
Ariel Levite, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, notes that only a small number of states once suspected of seeking nuclear weapons actually went on to acquire them. He argues that many alarmist assessments stem from an interpretation bias that overlooks alternative motivations behind nuclear activity. Homeira Moshirzadeh, a political scientist at the University of Tehran, contends that Iran’s nuclear program is built on three principles: independence (protecting sovereignty and rejecting foreign interference), justice (challenging double standards in the international system), and resistance (especially toward major powers, particularly the United States and Israel). These principles suggest that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are multifaceted and cannot be reduced to the simple claim that Iran “wants the bomb.”
Iran’s position as a nuclear‑latent state is tied to techno‑nationalism: like many countries in the Global South, it seeks nuclear knowledge as a marker of prestige, power, and sovereignty. U.S. and Israeli strikes on nuclear science facilities (along with other scientific, medical, and cultural sites) are therefore likely to be seen not only as violations of sovereignty but also as attacks on scientific progress itself, and as efforts to deny Iran even civilian nuclear expertise—a right guaranteed under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and afforded to other states.
Diplomacy and mistrust
Nuclear latency, from Iran’s perspective, can also protect against the US’s potential withdrawal from a future agreement, especially after the US’s exit from its nuclear deal with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Trump’s first term. Iran is thus likely to proceed with the pursuit of nuclear latency unless a deal is struck with the US, and it is unlikely that such a deal could enable an indefinite suspension of Iran’s pursuit of technical nuclear capabilities.
Iran has rejected what it calls the US’s a “maximalist approach", insisting that it will not accept being treated as an exception under international law. This stance is not new; Iran has maintained a largely consistent nuclear policy since the JCPOA in 2015. As tensions around negotiations grew, Iran warned that it would resume enrichment and related activities if the United States withdrew from the agreement, which it ultimately did. More recently, Tehran reaffirmed this position by rejecting a U.S. proposal to dismantle its nuclear facilities, while remaining open to negotiating the level and type of enrichment. Having endured attacks twice during negotiations, Iran’s mistrust of U.S. diplomacy may strengthen its belief that it must preserve its “right” to enrichment, even if a time‑limited deal pauses its activities. In current ceasefire talks, Iran has also sought to separate the nuclear issue from discussions on reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
Although Iran’s economy and productive capacity have been severely weakened by the ongoing war, Tehran has not shifted from its core position: it firmly rejects any proposal that would permanently restrict its enrichment capabilities. As a result, Iran is often described as being “trapped” within its own red lines, leaving little room for flexibility. Its political imagination may also be constrained by the scale of its investment in nuclear latency; the program is estimated to have cost up to ten times its original projection and has contributed to decades of sanctions that have harmed Iranians’ access to access to healthcare, education, and other fundamental rights. While the war has given Iran new forms of leverage in its dealings with the United States, it has shown no sign of retreating from its pursuit of nuclear technology.
Looking ahead, Iran’s commitment to nuclear latency—shaped by sovereignty concerns, mistrust, and decades of costly investment—suggests that its nuclear posture will remain a persistent source of friction. Without an understanding of these priorities and their strategic drivers, a long-term resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue will remain elusive.
About the authors: Hebatalla Taha and Dina Tawfik
