In this formulation, groups not traditionally associated with Twelver Shiism, such as the ‘Alawis of Syria or the Zaydis of Yemen, were suddenly deemed by journalists and pundits to be ‘Shias’.
The purpose of this sleight of hand was to simplify discussions of alliances in the region. In doing so, however, this language perpetuates a variety of misleading interpretations. Not only does it lack nuance, but it also assumes religious affinity is more important than political exigency in defining the affiliations of these groups.
Instead, religious identity matters when it facilitates alliances between actors such as Iran and Hezbollah who share political ends, but this emphasis on sectarian affinities obscures the underlying causes of conflicts and elides the agency of political actors.
Scholars debate whether an ‘ideological and geopolitical rivalry’ has existed between Saudi Arabia and Iran since 1979 (Mabon, 2015, p. 4), or whether ‘this rivalry is caused by regional instability generated by foreign interventions in the Gulf.’ (Keynoush, 2016, p. 2).
- I believe the competition between the two states is driven by ‘competing … . ethnonational and religious identities’ and ‘claim[s] to influence over the Persian Gulf region and the wider Middle East’ . Consequently, and with the instrumentalization of identities by both sides, the MENA region has become increasingly polarized in recent years between an Iranian and a Saudi camp. The Iranians are seen as representing a rising Persian Safavid/Shia empire and the Saudis as the defenders of Sunni Arabs, now beleaguered after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, says Rola El-Husseini.
2020-03-10