(CMES Research Seminar Feb 25)

1 What is the background to this report; why have you written it?

In 2018 I defended my Master thesis which looks at the theological aspect of the split between the most potent jihadi Salafi groups in the Levant in 2013; Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic state in Iraq, ISI. While writing my thesis I came to realize that the theological dimension, which helps shaping ideologies, of jihadi Salafi groups is the least explored in academia. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the rise and influence of jihadi Salafism. For the most part, though, the focus of this body of work has been on the sociology and activities of organizations such as al-Qaʿeda (AQ), with less attention paid to the details of the movements’ ideologies. Therefore, I decided to write a research or a report exploring theological concepts of jihadi Salafism. 

However, I found out that exploring these theological underpinnings would not sufficiently help explaining the political violence of jihadi Salafi groups unless I also examine the socio-political context in which they develop. In other words, I had to look at the how and why these concepts have developed in the light of their context. 

2 Who should read it, and why?

One of the issues that was a concern to me at the initial process of writing was the targeted audience and therefore the readability. The report not only dives into theology but also the history and politics of the Middle East since 80´s until present, which makes it appealing and useful for both policymakers and non-experts who are interested in understanding the historical development of jihadi Salafism and the whole region.  

3 How big a role, according to you, are religious beliefs playing in jihadi Salafi political violence?

As I extensively discussed in the report, religious beliefs, which stem from theology, do play an important role in jihadi-Salafi political violence. But at the same time, it is not safe to claim that theology is the main or the only driver behind the military activities of jihadi-Salafi militants.

What I tried to do is to interrogate the complicated relationship between the theological concepts of these groups and the ever-changing socio-political context in which these concepts have developed.

IS’s extremist interpretation of Islam did not come from a vacuum. It has developed through different historical phases characterized by the authoritarian rule of post-colonial states with repressive means of governance, endemic social and political conflicts and security vacuums, and endless economic stagnation and crises.

4 You mean that the evolution of jihadi-Salafism can be divided into five phases. Can you describe these phases briefly?

To capture the changes in the trajectory of jihadi Salafism, I tried to divide its evolution of into five historical contexts.

• During its first phase in the 1980´s, jihad was mainly focused on helping fellow Muslims in Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet forces out of the country.
• The socio-political context of the US military deployment in Saudi Arabia following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 1990, and its repercussions ushered in the second phase in the development of jihadi-Salafism. In 1996 and 1998 respectively, Bin laden and other jihadi ideologues issued two fatwas through which they made the case for jihad against the US military in Saudi Arabia and later against civilians of the US and its allies’ all over the world. Bin laden and the other jihadi ideologues framed jihad as fard ʿayn, which means that it is a legal obligation that must be performed by each individual Muslim capable of performing it. 
• The third phase of the movement’s evolution started with the US invasion of Afghanistan. Military success against AQ was achieved by capturing and assassinating many of AQ’s senior members and depriving the group from its safe haven. But thanks to AQ former strategist Abu Musab al-Suri for introducing the concept of ‘individual terrorism’ helping jihadis carrying out global terrorist attacks in their home countries without having organizational ties with AQ.
• The US invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Sadam Hussain’s regime mark the fourth phase in the trajectory of jihadi-Salafism. These actions led to security vacuum as well as the marginalization of the Sunni community in favor of the Shi’a Iraqi population. This in turn has created social, political and religious grievances, which were addressed by the jihadi Salafi group of ISI and used to recruit frustrated young Sunni Muslims. 
• Furthermore, the American military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 took place at the same time that Syria was facing extreme instability due to the escalation of the civil war. The establishment of ISI’s and AQ wing in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, marks the last phase, which manifested in jihadi-Salafi groups’ engagement in Arab spring as well as their irremeable split over ISI dispute with Jabhat al-Nusra in April 2013. A watershed moment in this phase was the announcement of the establishment of the caliphate by ISI or the Islamic state in Iraq.

5 Who are you and how come that this subject is of interest for you personally?

Coming from Syria, I have always felt that there is a misunderstanding of the Syrian conflict in Western media. Most of the time there are exaggeration and generalization when dealing with extremism and radicalization. Many think that all the opposition groups and individuals coming from their areas of influence are radical and maybe affiliated with IS or al-Qaeda, which is not true.

Also, it is not true that extremist groups do not exist in Syria and Iraq. I was surprised to know about them and their ability to spread their ideology. Therefore, I decided to depict a nuanced picture of what is really happening and how different actors interact to produce the reality we are facing these days.